On the State of the Global Economy in a multipolar world
Photo by Photo By: Kaboompics.com: https://www.pexels.com/photo/american-and-chinese-flags-and-usa-dollars-4386371/Here’s wishing all readers a very Happy New Year!
(2024 was a very eventful year.)
(It ended as it has started, with the world split into a multipolar system where the US and China are locked in competition; the war in Ukraine still ongoing, and different regions around the world, under stress. Further, the world is waiting for Donald Trump to resume the presidency of the United States. That is good in some respects, because his predecessor, Joe Biden, turned out to be a warmonger. He is entirely responsible for underwriting the war in Ukraine and possibly gave a blank cheque to Israel to do whatever they wanted in Gaza and Lebanon which ended up in genocide.)
(While he did not spark the rivalry between the US and China, he was the one who said that he would support Taiwan if China attacked it. This was effectively a call to Taiwan’s separatists to try for independence from the People’s Republic when the US is supposed to accept a one China policy. He was duplicitous. And senile, forgetting that the whole world has accepted that there is one China since the Potsdam Declaration at the end of WW2. Never before in human history has a brain-dead man have had so much impact on war and peace. Biden will be gone in days, on Jan 20th and the world should rejoice in that fact.)
(In the contest between the East and the West, it is interesting to know that beneath the diplomatic words, the US is not giving up trying to contain China.)
(The Americans are always trying to figure out if and when they can defeat China militarily. One of the signs of this is their annual report on the Chinese military. Don’t they know that China’s build-up in recent years is a response to America’s
containment policy? Even the Report below is worded provocatively.)
What the Pentagon’s New Report on Chinese Military Power Reveals About Capabilities, Context, and Consequences
Andrew Erickson
December 19, 2024
(China’s military is increasingly capable.)
Yesterday, the Pentagon released its 24th China Military Power Report since Congress initiated its mandate in 2000, offering revelations unavailable elsewhere.
The document reveals new details of the most dramatic military buildup since World War II, ongoing challenges that Chairman Xi Jinping and his party army are addressing with determination, and context to interpret what it all means. The bottom line: endemic corruption and lingering personnel and organizational weaknesses must be weighed against the Chinese Communist Party’s unrivaled ability to marshal resources and its ongoing production and deployment of advanced military systems on an unmatched industrial scale. Xi commands a system riven by brutal elite power struggles, but he is determined to pursue control over Taiwan with an increasingly potent toolkit. With deadly seriousness, he continues to advance sweeping organizational reforms to maximize relevant warfighting capabilities in fulfilment of his Centennial Military Building Goal of 2027, even at the cost of short-term churn and challenges.
Dramatic Developments: Nuclear Weapons, Manifold Missiles, Operational Options
Nothing looms larger than China’s determined advancements in nuclear weapons — arguably the ultimate military capability. By the report’s suspense date of “early 2024,” China already had more than 600 operational nuclear warheads, a surge from the more than 500 tabulated in last year’s edition. All of China’s roughly 400 intercontinental ballistic missiles can reach the continental United States.
China will likely have more than 1,000 operational warheads by 2030, most fielded on systems capable of ranging America’s homeland, many deployed at higher readiness. Stockpile growth will continue through 2035, which the Pentagon’s 2023 report projected “in line with previous estimates” and by which time the 2022 edition anticipated 1,500 warheads. Additional advanced nuclear delivery systems likely under development include strategic hypersonic glide vehicles and fractional orbital bombardment systems, the latter at least partially demonstrated in a 2021 test. These frontier efforts draw on potent dynamics, with the report judging that China “has the world’s leading hypersonic missile arsenal.” (This emphasis on missile technology -which is lower cost but highly effective - is Beijing’s way of staying on par with the US without spending an inordinate amount of money catching up on legacy weapons such as aircraft carriers, tanks and planes.)
Three new silo fields add 320 silos for solid-propellant intercontinental ballistic missiles. China is also more than doubling its DF-5 liquid-propellant intercontinental ballistic missile force to likely 50 silos. As part of an effort to upgrade older intercontinental ballistic missile families, including with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles, at least 30 new silos will hold the DF-5C. The Pentagon also anticipates possible silo and rail deployment of DF-41 road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles, which have up to three warheads each.
Already, China’s rocket force keeps some nuclear forces on heightened alert. New silo-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, at least three early warning satellites, and Russian assistance portend movement toward “early warning counterstrike” posture — what the United States terms “launch on warning.” In 2023, China test-launched two intercontinental ballistic missiles from training silos in western China.
This suggests at least some new silo-based units will assume a launch on warning posture.
As the second leg of China’s nuclear triad, Type 094 Jin-class ballistic missile submarines conduct near-continuous at-sea deterrence patrols. They can deploy the JL-3 submarine-launched ballistic missile, which can reach the continental United States from South China Sea or Bohai Gulf bastions. Type 094 production continues beyond today’s six deployed hulls, even though the improved Type 096 — to employ a submarine-launched ballistic missile with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles — is slated to begin production in the mid-2020s. The Pentagon allows for the possibility of 096 delays motivating the 094’s continued production, while alternatively positing “an effort to accelerate [China’s] sea-based nuclear capability as Xi has directed.” Xi’s rush to prepare for possible war over Taiwan on his watch supports the latter explanation. Rounding out China’s nuclear triad, the H-6N bomber can carry an air-launched ballistic missile, while an H-20 stealth bomber with a range of more than 10,000 kilometers is under development. (As a matter of fact, Xi Jinping has never said he is preparing for war over Taiwan; all he said was that China will not rule out military action, which is a very different proposition.)
Beijing’s nuclear buildup reflects determination to have usable military options on every rung of the escalation ladder. The urgency to do so is amplified by perceptions that China faces military competition, crisis, and possibly even conflict with America — the last most likely regarding Taiwan. Accordingly, China seeks to deter American and allied intervention in a Taiwan-related scenario if possible and control escalation if necessary: “The [People’s Liberation Army’s] expanding nuclear force will enable it to target more U.S. cities, military facilities, and leadership sites than ever before in a potential nuclear conflict.” That overriding priority is the only sufficient explanation for the dramatic departure under Xi from previous relative numerical restraint in nuclear weapons.
Beyond the nuclear weapons backstop, Beijing’s “counter-intervention” strategy and multi-domain precision warfare operations overwhelmingly emphasize multifarious missiles capable of delivering a full range of conventional payloads to all conceivable targets. For example, China has simulated “Joint Firepower Strike Operations” against Taiwan, in part by live-firing PCH191 close-range ballistic missiles in its 2022 exercises, and drilling with the missile in its 2023 exercises. This precision missile system would play a critical role in joint fires during a Taiwan campaign. These drills similarly showcased significant maritime force readiness and surge capacity. Additionally, China’s four Type 093B Shang III guided-missile nuclear attack submarines, three of which may be operational by some time next year, may have land-attack cruise missiles — a trend likely to spread to major warships.
Given concerns about U.S. Navy and allied forces’ involvement, China has leveraged decades of emphasis on ballistic missiles into five different types of anti-ship ballistic missiles. China’s first anti-ship ballistic missile, the DF-21D, is capable of rapid in-field reloading. The DF-26 anti-ship ballistic missile variant can rapidly be swapped with conventional and nuclear land-attack alternatives—the DF-26 is capable of nuclear precision strikes, potentially with low-yield optionality. In addition to conventional anti-ship and conventional and nuclear land-attack payloads, China’s numerous DF-17s have a hypersonic glide vehicle to evade U.S. and allied radar and ballistic missile defense.
DF-27 ballistic missiles with a 5,000- to 8,000-kilometer range are newly deployed. In addition to their conventional anti-ship mode, they can carry hypersonic and conventional and nuclear land-attack payloads.
Across the Board: Pushing Frontiers in Power Projection
While Taiwan and other disputed sovereignty claims within the First Island Chain are clearly China’s primary military focus, it is simultaneously pursuing a “world-class” military — equal or superior to the U.S. military — in keeping with its 2035 and 2049 development goals. This inherently requires global reach and cutting-edge operations in all domains.
The world’s second largest defense budget, which the Pentagon estimates at $330 to $450 billion, offers sufficient resources for comprehensive progress. China’s status as the world’s fourth largest arms supplier provides additional revenue. At more than 2 million active, 510,000 reserve, and 500,000 paramilitary personnel, the world’s largest military force has the people to cover its comprehensive missions.
China’s navy already has more than 370 ships and submarines (including more than 140 major surface combatants) — not counting the 22 Type 056 Jiangdao corvettes it transferred to the coast guard or the approximately 60 Type 022 Houbei missile catamarans it retains. The Pentagon forecasts 395 battle force ships by 2025, including 65 submarines, and 435 by 2030, including 80 submarines.
Rapidly approaching American technology standards, and finally powered by workable indigenous engines, China’s air force has 51 Y-20A heavy lift transports, whose up to 2,400-nautical-mile range may be extended by 16 Y-20U tankers.
Conclusion: Corruption, Competence, Capabilities
One of the most important questions that emerges from the Pentagon’s new report is: “How good is China’s military, and what does it all mean?” Part of the answer lies in the first and second of its three “Special Topics,” respectively covering the impacts of corruption in China’s military and political training in the force.
In its dedicated section on corruption, as elsewhere across its many pages, the Pentagon document does an admirable job of explaining what many all too often confuse if not actively misrepresent — “2027” is absolutely not a U.S. government construction or estimate per se, but rather Xi’s own grand plan: the Centennial Military Building Goal, a capabilities development deadline requiring China’s armed forces, inter alia, to give Xi a full toolbox of military operational options against Taiwan by 2027.
With some of the world’s greatest military resources at his command, Xi is pressing ahead with determination. If Xi were not safely in command of China’s military, he would not have visited Spain, Brazil, Peru, and Morocco — or anywhere abroad—in November 2024. If there were prohibitive concerns about their disloyalty or disarray, China’s armed forces would not have been directed to conduct extensive operations around Taiwan just now. If the imprisonment of former China State Shipbuilding Corporation chairman Hu Wenming, who oversaw China’s aircraft carrier development program, and his general manager Sun Bo reflected fundamental defects in naval shipbuilding, we would not be facing the formidable armada hitting the waters today.
Despite all the drama and “palace intrigue,” we must never lose sight of an important paradox: China has the world’s largest bureaucracy to propagandize its greatest strengths while hiding (or at least dismissing) its greatest weaknesses. America, by contrast, ultimately bares all for all to see. It is an elementary analytical error to confuse the respective great powers’ “dirty laundry” with their “designer clothes.”
China’s “designer clothes” include some of the world’s most numerous and diverse missile systems, whose frontier technologies include some of the world’s most advanced hypersonic glide vehicles — a force to be reckoned with, by any measure. The relentless development and deployment of the impressive hardware documented throughout the report would be simply impossible if corruption and executive removals left China’s defense industry in disarray.
China’s “dirty laundry” includes endemic graft, pay-to-play, and other influence peddling, and its periodic weaponization in brutal elite political struggles, sometimes with direct impact within its party army. It’s not a bug — it’s an enduring feature of a system in which the party is inherently above the law. Admiral Miao Hua’s fall is but the latest example. There have been many others, and there will be many more. Indeed, given the way investigations tend to unravel personal patronage networks, some big new shoes may be dropping soon.
On the one hand, Xi undoubtedly faces elite power competition, particularly when he makes decisions that turn out to be unsuccessful or controversial (such as his longtime support of his former loyalist Miao). But on the other hand, Xi clearly continues to engage in ambitious military restructuring efforts that prioritize improvements in warfighting capabilities. These efforts would only be possible and desirable for a leader reasonably secure in his position and thus able to impose some of the most demanding requirements conceivable on China’s armed forces. A weak and vulnerable leader, by contrast, would be far more likely to “go along to get along” with superficial military showcasing and coddling of prominent military stakeholders, or a more “hands-off” approach akin to that of Xi’s predecessor Hu Jintao.
The most sweeping, telling recent element of Xi’s continued defense reforms, as discussed throughout the report, is arguably his disestablishment of the Strategic Support Force on 19 April 2024 — the very force he created in 2015. He has reassigned its subordinate forces, the Aerospace Force and the Cyberspace Force, directly under the Central Military Commission. To these, he has added a new Information Support Force. These reforms are challenging, as the Pentagon explains in detailing their complex nature, but are required to give China’s military the best possible network and communication systems management to enable the successful prosecution of high-end warfare against the most capable opponent(s). The last is clearly what Xi is prioritizing.
Another revealing element of ongoing military reforms under Xi documented in multiple sections of the report is the transfer in 2023 of many shore-based units, including 300 fighter aircraft (e.g., all JH-7 maritime strike fighter-bombers) as well as all H-6J maritime strike bombers, from the navy to the air force so that the former can focus on carrier aviation, the latter on command and control as well as integrated air defense. China’s air force thus acquired fixed-wing combat aviation units, radar and air defense units, and related facilities that had long belonged to its navy, which surely opposed relinquishing them. Only a powerful, warfighting-focused leader would have the capability and intention to kick the hornet’s nest of interservice rivalry in the service of advancing unforgiving combat power.
In sum, nothing revealed in the report suggests problems sufficient to frustrate Xi’s pursuit of his top-priority target: military modernization to help assert control over Taiwan first and foremost. The purging of former Central Military Commission vice chairmen Xu Caihou and Guo Boxiong in 2014 and 2015, respectively, was far more significant than Miao’s fall as a lower-ranking commission member. Yet in the decade since, China has attained the most dramatic military buildup since World War II, with definite improvements in organization and human capacity in addition to the “designer clothes” hardware that all but overflows from the report’s data-packed pages. The best explanation for all that the Pentagon, and we readers, can see is that Xi is accepting political and organizational risk up front to maximize his system’s strengths and his own ability to advance his larger goals perhaps somewhat further down the road.
This is the bigger picture that we lose sight of at our own risk. Revealing China’s weaknesses to deter and buy time is part of the strategy we need, but only part; we must not fool ourselves into complacency. The other part is recognizing that Xi is a man on a mission with a military to match and urgently shoring up defenses and deterrence while we still have time.
Andrew S. Erickson, PhD, is a professor of strategy at the U.S. Naval War College and visiting scholar at Harvard’s Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies. In 2024 he received the Navy Superior Civilian Service Medal.
Six Takeaways From the Pentagon’s Report on China’s Military
by David Sacks, Author
December 20, 2024 7:36 pm (EST)
On Wednesday, December 18, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) released a 182-page report on China’s military. The China Military Power Report, as it is colloquially known, was mandated by Congress in 2000 and has been issued every year since, providing the best unclassified resource on the state of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Analysts of the PLA and China more broadly eagerly await its release, comparing passages and tables against previous versions to see how China’s military is evolving.
This year’s report revised upwards the estimate of China’s defense budget, the second-largest in the world (behind the United States), to one-and-a-half to two times its public defense budget ($330 billion to $450 billion (or about the same as the US budget). While the report included a special section on corruption in the PLA, it would be a mistake to focus on this issue at the expense of the significant strides China is clearly making toward building a highly modern and capable military that can threaten the United States and its allies and partners. Indeed, the fact that China’s leader Xi Jinping continues to aggressively root out corruption in the PLA over a decade into his tenure demonstrates his determination to have a military that can provide him with credible options to achieve his political objectives, above all unification with Taiwan.
Here are six takeaways from this year’s report:
Asia Unbound
First, China’s rapid expansion and modernization of its nuclear force continues, in an attempt to provide Beijing with greater control of escalation dynamics in a potential war with the United States. DoD estimates that China has over 600 operational nuclear warheads, up from 500 last year, and still estimates that China will have over 1,000 nuclear warheads by 2030 and will continue to expand its nuclear force beyond that. In addition to the expansion of its nuclear arsenal, China is also improving every element of its triad. China completed construction of three new missile fields with 320 silos for intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and is developing new, more survivable ICBMs. In addition, its ballistic missile submarines conduct at sea deterrent patrols armed with missiles that can reach the continental United States, its nuclear-capable bombers continue to be deployed, and it is reportedly considering a rail-mobile launch option. China is also developing fractional orbital bombardment systems and hypersonic glide vehicles, with Beijing now possessing “the world’s leading hypersonic missile arsenal.” China’s readiness is improving, with the report noting the “PLA is working to implement a launch on warning (LOW) posture this decade, called ‘early warning counterstrike,’ where warning of a missile strike leads to a counterstrike before an enemy first strike can detonate.” In a sobering note, the report states that China’s “force modernization suggests that it seeks the ability to inflict far greater levels of overwhelming damage to an adversary in a nuclear exchange.”
Second, China’s overall military readiness and proficiency continues to increase. The report noted the PLA Navy (PLAN) “maintains its surface fleet at high readiness with an emphasis on enabling a surge capacity to respond to regional contingencies…The PLAN’s submarine fleet is similarly positioned to maintain high readiness, with an increasing focus on real-world contingency training further from shore for longer periods of time.” The PLA Air Force (PLAAF), meanwhile, “has embarked on a set of major institutional reforms aimed at creating a modern, professional fighting force. A major tenant of these reforms is an effort to train and exercise under what the PLA refers to as ‘actual combat conditions,’ which include training and exercise scenarios meant to mimic real-world battle conditions.” The PLA Army (PLAA) “continued to improve its methods and standards of training combined arms units.” Finally, the PLA Rocket Force “routinely practices live-fire strikes on mock airfields, bunkers, aircraft, and ships, indicating that the PLARF is improving its readiness for several counter intervention strike contingencies.”
Third, China is building a global military and investing in capabilities that will allow it to project power far beyond the first island chain. In 2023, the PLAN “continued to grow its ability to perform missions beyond the First Island Chain” and in the near term it “will have the ability to conduct long-range precision strikes against land targets from its submarine and surface combatants using land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs), notably enhancing the PRC’s power projection capability.” The PLAAF’s bomber fleet now offers “a long-range standoff precision strike capability that can range targets in the Second Island Chain from home airfields in mainland China.” The report notes China “is seeking to expand its overseas logistics and basing infrastructure” and that it “probably has considered other countries as locations for PLA military logistics facilities, including but not limited to Burma, Thailand, Indonesia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, United Arab Emirates, Cuba, Kenya, Equatorial Guinea, Seychelles, Tanzania, Angola, Nigeria, Namibia, Mozambique, Gabon, Bangladesh, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, and Tajikistan.” Assistant Secretary of Defense Ely Ratner remarked during an event introducing the report that, “The demand from the PRC for these things [overseas bases and facilities] is vast. They will take almost anything they can get globally. Their list of targets is very, very long.”
Fourth, China’s military modernization is enabled by a world-class defense industrial base. The PLAN is numerically the largest navy in the world, with 370 ships and submarines, while DoD projects it will have 395 ships by 2025 and 435 by 2030. China “is capable of producing a wide range of naval combatants, gas turbine and diesel engines, and shipboard weapons and electronic systems, making it nearly self-sufficient for all shipbuilding needs.” It has “sufficient capacity to produce any required numbers of naval classes: submarines, surface combatants, and auxiliary and amphibious ships.” This stands in stark contrast to a U.S. defense industrial base that is struggling to produce everything from submarines to surface warships and munitions.
Fifth, corruption remains endemic within the PLA. During the second half of 2023, at least 15 high-ranking military officers and executives from China’s defense industry were removed, including senior leaders of the PLARF, a defense minister who was previously in charge of the Equipment Development Department, and the head of China’s largest missile manufacturer. These personnel issues “may have disrupted the PLA’s progress toward stated 2027 modernization goals,” the report concludes. At the same time, however, Xi’s determination to confront corruption within the military should be seen as evidence of his determination to build a world-class military. As Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Michael Chase said during the report’s rollout, “despite what the PRC sees as an increasingly turbulent strategic environment and domestic challenges, they continue to forge ahead with the pursuit of Xi Jinping’s national strategy and they continue to work toward his military modernization goals for the PLA.”
Sixth, China’s military modernization remains focused on Taiwan. The report notes that China’s leadership views unification with Taiwan as a fundamental condition of national rejuvenation, which must be accomplished by 2049. To that end, “the PLA is aggressively developing capabilities to provide options for the PRC to dissuade, deter, or, if ordered, defeat third-party intervention in the Asia-Pacific region” (i.e. Taiwan). Its nuclear expansion is a key pillar of that effort, as China likely believes that a larger arsenal will allow it to deter U.S. intervention, check potential U.S. nuclear escalation, and provide a greater degree of escalation control.
The PLA continues to hone its skills for an attack on Taiwan. The report assessed that “PLA training and exercises increasingly focus on military contingencies in the Taiwan Strait while simultaneously delaying or denying third-party intervention. During 2023, the PLA conducted exercises around Taiwan to improve joint operations and combat readiness with simultaneous land, air, and sea exercises.” China’s Joint Sword exercise in April 2023 marked the first time “in which an aircraft carrier simulated targeting Taiwan.”
At the same time, however, DoD assesses that the PLA “has not yet demonstrated the type and scale of sophisticated urban warfare or long-distance logistics capabilities that would likely be required for operations against Taiwan or major contingencies overseas.” Ely Ratner also noted in his public comments, “to the extent that their particular goal is to be feeling ready and confident that they can execute a short, sharp invasion of Taiwan at acceptable cost, they’re not there today. They’re trying to get there…But it’s not clear they’re getting any closer than they were over the last couple of years.”
(The China Military Power report was published before Christmas. On Dec 26, probably in response, the Chinese demonstrated two new sixth generation fighter jets. This caught many western analysts by surprise. Because these aircraft flew before the Americans launched their own 6th generation warplanes, which was apparently shelved a few years ago when it was thought to be too expensive (US$300m each compared to the current 5th generation planes such as the F35 which are about $85m each.) And the Chinese tested two at the same time, the J36 and the JH-XX, on what would have been Mao’s birthday. This was unprecedented. The whole world has come to regard American air dominance to be unquestioned.
And this is even more surprising since in the recent Zhuhai airshow just a couple of months ago, the Chinese just demonstrated a fifth generation fighter, the J35, as well as another 6th generation plane, the Baidi, or White Emperor. Those already caused quite a stir. For another two 6G fighters to be launched so quickly demonstrates the immense scientific accomplishment of China. Most nations struggle to get the latest 5th generation up in the air. Now China has done that J35 aircraft plus another three 6th Generation fighter. Three, not one. It totally floors all the observers and naysayers who used to say that China copies and imitates American technology. No longer. In this space where America would traditionally claim mastery, they have been bested. China has won.
And the PLA Navy, after launching a massive aircraft carrier – the Fujian - that matches, at least on paper, the best the US can offer, just a year or so ago, it launched another innovative vessel, the Sichuan, which can launch both helicopters and fixed wing drones (plus fixed wing planes). It is designated as a “drone carrier” – a “mini” ship. This is also new. It is innovation because it is the first time a dedicated drone carrier has ever been done by the world’s navies. The Sichuan is a relatively small vessel but carries all the offensive punch of a traditional carrier. So there is a clear demonstration of how the PLA is now matching up to the leading military power in the world and the message is clear – we are not far behind. They can do similar or better technology at much lower cost.
How is this possible? With a smaller budget, the Chinese are able to catch up with the Americans, undisputed leader in military technology since WW2. The first point is that the Chinese probably have a bigger budget from what they say they have – the profits from arms sales to other countries can be ploughed back to the Chinese military budget. And then consider purchasing power parity – a yuan spent in China is probably worth more than its equivalent in the States. In PPP terms, the US and Chinese budgets probably can provide the same effectiveness on the battlefield with their respective weapons. And the Americans have to devote significant resources from their budget to take care of their veterans from previous forever wars. That’s not money actively improving the weaponry. And since the Chinese defence industry is not necessarily working purely for profit, unlike the MIC in the US, the cost of production can be much lower than in the US. I remember reading how a toilet seat on an American military ship or plane costs 100 x the same thing in the civilian world.
Add to that the fact that industrial labour in the US is very high cost due to the intrinsically higher cost of living in the US – not just in weapons production but across the board. An ordinary worker on the factory line in a car manufacturing plant makes $100,000 a year. That is untenable anywhere else in the world. We may say that the US has lost its magic as an industrial power house. Just look at the recent air crashes involving Boeing 737 planes…what happened? Where is the quality control? The accountability? The paradigm of excellence in aerospace engineering is no more. That must also be the case in military aircraft engineering and shipbuilding.
And China graduates 1.7million STEM graduates every year. The USA? Less than a tenth of that. One stunning statistic I saw is that in a single year, the Chinese graduate as many engineers as there are engineers in America. STEM work is considered geeky, and the best talent do not want to go into engineering or research. American talent graduating from college want to play in the NFL, the NBA, work in Wall Street or as lawyers and consultants. None of them want to sweat it out in the field or in factories. It is popular belief that Chinese staff can handle the geeky jobs. With the tightening of immigration in the US and general racial discrimination, many of the young men and women of Chinese heritage now want to go home to the PRC. Many of them are STEM graduates. There is therefore a large and high grade scientific work force that is behind China’s tech revolution. It makes a lot of difference.
Does this mean that China will attack Taiwan. Well, if you ask me, Beijing has said there is no such intention, but it is also clear that Beijing want the US to be less bombastic in their rhetoric about attacking China. Too many American generals and hawks in Congress have been saying they are preparing to go to war with China. With these advances in military technology, it will give the Americans room to think twice before uttering another challenge or pout more crap from their mouths.
I think that ultimately, while Taiwan is a nice place and its people pleasant, it is a small country that should not try to be independent. 95% of the world do not think of Taiwan as a sovereign country. Sure, they may not want to be part of the CCP that beat the KMT 80 years ago, but are they better off being Americans? Not necessarily. They will always be second class citizens over there. On the other hand, many Chinese from Taiwan will be attracted to migrate to China, and over time, there will not be any distinction between Taiwanese and Mainlanders. Ten years ago, I saw this happening on the mainland. In places like Kunshan (an hour’s drive from Shanghai), there are many Taiwanese expatriates who are married to locals and this would be the beginning of integration. It was actually only on American provocation that Taiwanese felt that they are different from their cousins on the other side of the Taiwan Straits. With Trump policies which call for Taiwanese having to pay for their protection, many will likely say I am better off with the PRC. One country two systems in the making assisted by Trumpism. Ultimate reunification in progress.
With that said, the war between NATO and Russia is drawing to a close as the Ukrainian army is showing signs of cracking.)
Ukrainian Army Desertion Rates Surge Amid Catastrophic Personnel Losses: Most Conscripts Just Trying to Escape
Eastern Europe and Central Asia , Ground , Battlefield
Military Watch Magazine Editorial Staff
December-2nd-2024
The Ukrainian Army is suffering from a surge in desertion rates, with the extremely high casualties and very low life expectancy for personnel providing a growing incentive for new conscripts to seek to escape military service.
A recent assessment by the Financial Times found than twice as many Ukrainian soldiers were charged with desertion in 2024 compared to the already high rates seen in the two preceding years, limiting the country’s ability to replenish its ranks. 60,000 cases against deserters were opened from January to October.
Analysts have noted that an important contributing factor has been the lack of provisions for demobilisation even for the country’s longest serving conscripts, leaving personnel exhausted and denying them the usual four-week rotations off the front lines for rest and retraining. As one officer informed the Times: “They’re just killing them, instead of letting them rehabilitate and rest,” with those killed being replaced by draftees with substandard training.
The report was published days after a statement by a Ukrainian member of parliament that as many as 200,000 personnel may have deserted since February 2022. Footage of increasingly extreme methods used both by conscription officers to recruit new personnel, and by draftees to escape the front lines, have circulated increasingly widely on the Internet from late 2023, with draft dodgers interviewed citing the extreme casualty rates on the front lines and the lack of preparation that personnel received as reasons for their actions. “Men who are the right age for the military draft are scared to walk freely in the street,” one draft-dodger informed The Telegraph in late November, with recruiters referring to approaching potential draftees as “like dealing with a cornered rat.” The magnitude of Ukrainian losses was a factor in the projections of Russian intelligence that Kiev’s supporters in the Western world were increasingly seriously considering extreme measures, including large scale ground force deployments, to reverse the tide of the war.
Highlighting the extent of the issue, officers informed CNN that most the majority of conscripted personnel were trying to escape. "They go to their positions once, and if they survive, they never come back. They either abandon their positions, or refuse to go into battle, or try to find a way to leave the army," one officer stated. Ukrainian commanders previously informed the Financial Times that conscripts on some areas of the front suffered 50 to 70 percent casualty rates within days of their first rotations. “When the new guys get to the position, a lot of them run away at the first shell explosion,” one deputy commander fighting near Ugledar in the disputed Donetsk region stated.
Another commander, whose unit was attempting to hold the nearby town of Khurakove, reported: “some guys freeze [because] they are too afraid to shoot the enemy, and then they are the ones who leave in body bags or severely wounded.” Experienced soldiers “are being killed off too quickly” and replaced by older and less fit men, another commander informed the Financial Times. “As infantry, you need to run, you need to be strong, you need to carry heavy equipment…It’s hard to do that if you aren’t young,” he elaborated. “Some of them don’t even know how to hold their rifles,” another officer recalled. The Times noted that remaining survivors would desert as soon as they could. Desertions were also common among personnel who were sent to NATO member states in Europe for training, where escape was seen to be easier than in Ukraine itself.
In April 2023 Ukrainian ambassador to the United Kingdom Vadim Pristaiko revealed that Kiev was concealing the full number of casualties suffered by the country in its ongoing war effort, stating that “it has been our policy from the start not to discuss our losses,” but that “when the war is over, we will acknowledge this. I think it will be a horrible number.” Western sources have since then continued to widely report on the extreme casualty rates suffered by Ukrainian conscript units and the lack of training they had.
The Wall Street Journal reported in mid-2023 that the Ukrainian Army had been recruiting poor men from villages, furnishing them with Soviet-era rifles and uniforms, and after just two nights at a base sending them to the frontlines. Some of the conscripts sought to sign an official refusal on the basis that they didn’t have proper training, with one recalling that when he protested that he had never held a gun before, the Ukrainian sergeant major replied “Bakhmut will teach you” - a reference to the frontline city at the centre of the fighting in the region. The Journal observed that conscripts referred to the frontlines in Bakhmut as “hell on earth.”
Former U.S. Marine Troy Offenbecker who fought in Bakhmut summarised that Ukrainian and allied forces in Bakhmut faced: “a lot of casualties. The life expectancy is around four hours on the frontline." Clashes were ”chaotic" and were dubbed "the meat grinder” by the Ukrainians, he added, with Russian artillery strikes being “nonstop," while Western claims of Russian ammunition shortages appeared far removed from the reality on the ground. Prevailing reports indicate that conditions and life expectancy on high intensity frontiers have only deteriorated since then, with the discrepancy in firepower between Russian and Ukrainian forces having continued to grow significantly.
Here are more headlines on the same problem:
https://www.euronews.com/2024/11/30/tens-of-thousands-of-soldiers-have-deserted-from-ukraines-army
https://www.voanews.com/a/bloodied-ukrainian-troops-risk-losing-more-hard-won-land-in-kursk-to-russia/7917149.html
https://thedefensepost.com/2024/12/02/ukrainian-army-soldiers-deserted/
https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/can-ukraines-army-survive-its-deserter-crisis/
https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/ukrainian-army-desertion-surge-catastrophic-losses
(Unfortunately, the manpower shortage is not the only Ukrainian problem. A NYT report tells us that the latest American wunderweapon – ATACMs, a type of long range missile - has not done anything to improve the odds of Kyiv winning the war:)
Ukraine Slows Firing of Missiles Into Russia as Trump Prepares to Take Office
The long-range missiles provided by the United States and Britain were used to strike inside Russian territory, despite concerns that their use would escalate the conflict. Kyiv’s stockpiles are running out.
By Kim BarkerLara JakesEric SchmittHelene Cooper and Julian E. Barnes
Dec. 27, 2024
With much fanfare, Ukraine was granted permission to fire Western long-range missiles at Russian military targets more than a month ago. But after initially firing a flurry of them, Ukraine has already slowed their use.
Kyiv is running out of missiles (they were given 500 missiles and 50 are left). It also might be running out of time: President-elect Donald J. Trump has said publicly that allowing U.S.-made long-range missiles inside Russia was a big mistake. (From public accounts, about half a dozen out of 450 missiles reached their targets; the rest were downed by Russian electronic anti-aircraft.)
So far, the missiles have been effective in limited ways (5 out of 450 were not shot out of the sky? No, they were not effective at all…), but they have not changed the war’s trajectory, senior NATO officials said.
The war has also not escalated as some had feared. Although Russia launched a powerful new intermediate-range hypersonic ballistic missile at a Ukrainian weapons facility after the first two volleys of Western long-range missiles, it has since responded to them with its usual mix of drones, missiles and threats.
Two U.S. officials said they believed Russia was trying to avoid escalating military operations in Ukraine, especially with the election of Mr. Trump, a longtime skeptic of the war, and given Russia’s recent battlefield successes. They spoke on the condition of anonymity given the political sensitivities.
Adm. Rob Bauer, NATO’s most senior military officer, said recently that the strikes by the long-range ballistic Army Tactical Missile System, or ATACMS, had “seriously hit a number” of weapons factories and ammunition depots in Russia. He said that had forced Russia to move many logistics facilities farther back from the front.
“They don’t like the ATACMS coming in their own country, through the air — they don’t, because they are effective (effective?? Really??) Admiral Bauer said in an interview in early December.
“That limits their ability to fight effectively at the front, and that’s what you want,” he added. “The question is, then, is it enough to win?”
In some ways, what has happened with the ATACMS — pronounced “attack ’ems” — is the story of what has happened with other Western weaponry in the war. Ukraine pressed for months and even years to get Western weapons: HIMARS rocket launchers, Abrams tanks and F-16 fighter jets.
But by the time the West granted access to these weapons, Ukraine had lost more ground. And no weapon has been a silver bullet. (That would be the definition of “ineffective”). Western officials also say Ukraine has relied too much on help from the West and hasn’t done enough to bolster its own war effort, especially in mobilizing enough troops.
The United States had long resisted sending Ukraine long-range ATACMS, with a range of 190 miles, fearing that their use deep inside nuclear-armed Russia would escalate the war.
In the spring, President Biden relented. The administration shipped Ukraine as many as 500 missiles from Pentagon stockpiles, the U.S. officials said. While Ukraine couldn’t use them in Russia, they fired them at targets in eastern Ukrainian territories controlled by Russia and in Crimea, seized by Russia in 2014 — aiming at hardened command and control posts, weapons storage areas and some other bunkers.
U.S. and NATO officials said those strikes had been effective, but also said that they felt Ukraine could have been more judicious in the number of missiles used and more selective with targeting.
The U.S. officials said Mr. Biden had justified granting permission on Nov. 17 to use the missiles in Russia because Moscow brought North Korean soldiers into the war. (That propaganda about N Koreans has brought down another US ally, South Korean president, Yoon Suk-yeol, as well as his successor, the new acting president, Han Duck soo. There is now a political vacuum in Seoul. That’s a complete disaster…)
There were caveats, though. U.S. officials said the weapons would initially be used mainly against Russian and North Korean troops in the Kursk region of western Russia, where Ukraine was trying to hold onto territory after a surprise Ukrainian offensive in August.
At that point, Ukraine had only “tens of the missiles” left — maybe about 50, the two U.S. officials said. It had no likelihood of getting more, they said.
The limited American supplies had already been assigned for deployment in the Middle East and Asia. Officials in Britain, which allowed Ukraine to use its long-range Storm Shadow missiles inside Russia after Mr. Biden’s decision, also said recently that it didn’t have many more to provide.
It is unlikely that Mr. Trump will step in to fill the gap. He recently told Time magazine that he disagreed “very vehemently” with Ukraine’s use of ATACMS in Russian territory and called Mr. Biden’s decision to provide them “foolish.” The next day, the Kremlin said Mr. Trump’s position “fully aligned” with Moscow.
Since the United States and Britain granted permission, Ukraine has launched at least a half-dozen missile strikes, using at least 31 ATACMS and 14 Storm Shadows, according to the Russian Defense Ministry and Russian military bloggers. The Ukrainian military does not comment on the use of the missiles, but neither the United States nor Ukraine has challenged those reports.
The most damaging attack appears to have been from Storm Shadows fired on Nov. 20 at a Russian command bunker near Maryino, Kursk, officials and analysts said.
On Nov. 21, Russia launched its new hypersonic ballistic missile, the Oreshnik, or “hazelnut tree,” at a military facility in the Ukrainian city of Dnipro. That was seen as a warning that Russia could hit any part of Europe with the new missile, a message to Europe and America about possible consequences.
Six days later, the Russian general who was the architect of the Ukraine invasion called Mr. Biden’s top military adviser to discuss concerns about escalation, insisting that its missile test had been long planned.
After that Nov. 27 call, Ukraine didn’t fire ATACMS or Storm Shadows for two weeks. Russia also launched few missile or drone attacks into Ukraine, although Russia’s president, Vladimir V. Putin, threatened to launch the Оreshnik at the center of Кyiv if Ukraine didn’t stop using ATACMS in Russia.
Despite his public threats, Mr. Putin is trying to react carefully to Ukrainian operations, the U.S. officials said. They believe Moscow will most likely not respond to ATACMS strikes in a way that could risk drawing Washington deeper in the fight or put the new administration in an awkward position as it comes in.
Moscow could step up cyber or sabotage operations in Europe, but it is unlikely to directly target U.S. interests, the officials said.
Some analysts said Ukraine had slowed its missile use because it had initially targeted Russian facilities it had long wanted to hit. Now, with few missiles remaining, Ukraine is being more deliberate.
“We decided to wait and find high-value capability, and that’s natural,” said Mykola Bielieskov, a military analyst at Ukraine’s government-run National Institute for Strategic Studies. “Don’t expect quick returns, because we need to preserve this capability and spend it judiciously and very wisely.”
On Dec. 11, Russia’s Defense Ministry said Ukraine had attacked a military airfield in the southern Russian city of Taganrog, a seaport on the Azov Sea, with six ATACMS, and it promised retaliation against Ukraine.
The United States then issued a rare warning: that Russia could be preparing tо fire an Оreshnik. Instead, Russia retaliated with a large-scale aerial attack, firing 93 missiles and almost 200 drones at Ukraine’s energy sector.
On Dec. 18, Ukraine fired six of the missiles and four Storm Shadows at one of the country’s largest chemical industry facilities in Russia’s Rostov region, according to the Russian Ministry of Defense.
Two days later, Russia fired a barrage of missiles at Kyiv; Russian officials claimed they were in retaliation for the Western missile strikes.
I have written in this blog before, over many months, that Ukraine is losing the war. If desertion leading to a shortage of 200,000 troops does not sink the Ukraine project, and the new advanced weapons (of which only 5 out of 450 have actually reached target…) have not turned the tables around, nothing else will. The war has been decided. How will it end?
Here is an opinion from Dr Gilbert Doctorow,
End of War in Ukraine
December 28, 2024 8 Minutes, Dr Gilbert Doctorow
(Dr Doctorow is a Russian expert who provides analyses frequently on many of the Youtube channels I follow.)
I open with a word of appreciation to a colleague for directing my attention to the latest essay on possible outcomes of the Special Military Operation published by the leading Russian political scientist and military expert, Dmitry Trenin. A ‘full’ version of his essay in Russian came out on the website of the authoritative Russian Council on International Relations on 18 December:
https://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-and-comments/comments/kakoy-dolzhna-stat-ukraina-posle-zaversheniya-rossiyskoy-spetsoperatsii/
A slightly shorter English language version published two days later is available here:
Dmitry Trenin: What Ukraine should look like after Russia’s victory
For those who are not acquainted with Trenin’s background, I offer some relevant information: He had a distinguished 20-year career as a Soviet, then Russian military officer reaching the grade of lieutenant colonel. Five of these years he spent in East Germany, based in Potsdam, presumably in intelligence work. The next five years he taught in the Military Institute of the Ministry of Defense, while also completing a doctoral program within the Institute of the USA and Canada. From 1985 to 1991 he was a member of the Soviet delegation to the US-Soviet negotiations over arms control in Geneva.
In the new millennium, Trenin positioned himself as a genial intermediary in Russian-US relations by serving from 2008 to 2022 as the head of the Carnegie Center Moscow. This US financed think tank in fact was a prestigious refuge for seditious anti-Putin, anti-Russia members of the Moscow intelligentsia.
With the launch of the SMO, the Carnegie Moscow was finally shut down and Dmitry Trenin had an epiphany moment; as did other long-time intermediaries between East and West like Dmitry Simes Sergei Karaganov and Dmitry Medvedev. All of these converts to strongly formulated Russian patriotism have been said in the West to speak for Putin today, however I believe that their supposed closeness to the Russian president is grossly exaggerated.
In this essay, Trenin sketches four possible outcomes of the war:
1. Conquest of the entire country and its full integration into the Russian Federation which will then assume its reconstruction and rehabilitation. This he rejects as imposing too great financial and administrative burdens on Russia
2. A Western oriented Ukraine – which he believes would be the worst outcome, since it would constitute a large and populous country with revanchist and hostile intentions towards Russia supported by its friends abroad.
3. A failed state, wrecked Ukraine left to dry in the wind. This also would be dangerous for Russia because the internal chaos of contending parties on Ukrainian territory would spill over into Russia.
4. A divided Ukraine. I quote:
Anti-Russian forces could be pushed into the western regions under NATO protection, possibly splitting the country into a “Free Ukraine” controlled by Poland, Hungary, and Romania, and a new Ukraine. Let the West console itself with this Cold War-style buffer state.
This Trenin calls ‘the most realistic and advantageous outcome.”
Trenin seems content for the rump Western Ukraine consisting of former Polish (Volhynia, Galicia), Hungarian and Romanian territory from before WWII be protected by NATO. I call this peculiar logic, since the whole purpose of the Special Military Operation was to remove NATO from all of Ukraine, as the first step towards an overall roll-back of NATO installations to their pre-1994 borders, before its expansion eastward began in the Clinton years. That was precisely the objective stated by Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov in December 2021, when Russia officially demanded that its security concerns finally be dealt with by the USA and NATO.
Trenin does not tell us where the borders between the two Ukraines would be drawn. Nor does he say where the borders of the Russian Federation would be with the ‘New Ukraine’ that is nominally independent but clearly in the Russian sphere of influence. Over time he expects the ‘New Ukraine’ to pass from being pacified, to being peaceful to being an ally of Russia. Russia will assist the reconstruction of the ‘New Ukraine.’
All that Trenin says about borders is the following:
Crimea, Donbass, and two other regions have already returned to Russia through referendums. More will likely follow – perhaps Odessa, Nikolayev, Kharkov, or Dnepropetrovsk. But not all of them. We will take only what can be integrated and defended. Expansion must be strategic, not emotional.
If strategic considerations indeed will be the basis for defining new borders, then Russia surely will take and keep Kharkov, Nikolayev and Odessa.
I stress that the reasons for taking and keeping these cities will not depend on the fact that they were always populated predominantly by Russians and have large Russian populations today. No, the strategic logic for each is as follows:
Kharkov borders on three Russian Federation oblasts and has been used as the launching grounds for Ukrainian artillery and missile attacks as well as for armed incursions. It must be pacified and held.
Nikolayev is on the route to Odessa. And Odessa is the essential outpost consolidating Russian access to the Transdnistria, the break-away Russian populated enclave in Moldova that now may become the next flashpoint between Russia and NATO as its president Sandu draws ever closer to the EU and NATO, and as she prepares for an armed assault on the Transdnistria. If taking this stretch of the Black Sea littoral deprives Ukraine of a seaport, so much the better.
In conclusion, Trenin’s paper raises more questions than it answers. Vladimir Putin’s in-house team will have to do a great deal of work in coming weeks to have in hand its negotiating positions for any discussions with Donald Trump over an eventual peace.
©Gilbert Doctorow, 2024
(My take on the Ukraine war is that the war was lost when Kyiv expended most of its strength in the summer offensive of 2023, when it threw its army aimlessly against a wall of impregnable Russian defences along the southern border of the occupied territories won by Moscow during the opening months of its special military operation. The Ukrainians captured no significant territory and incurred significant losses in doing so. Most of the western weapons acquired by Kyiv were destroyed against Russian set defences. Now it has no trained soldiers left and no western equipment to equip new recruits (not that this would help).
(When the Russians started to counter-attack from the spring of this year, the reports emanating from the frontlines is that Kyiv kept losing territory without any bounce-back. This was a sure sign of battlefield defeat. We all know the formidable capabilities of the Russian military from WW2, when it lost all of European Russia and still eventually conquered Berlin in 1945. You cannot get a more martially oriented and determined country than that. To have taken on such a foe meant that NATO was not thinking things through, and reflected a sense of their misguided hubris regarding their own technological superiority and their underlying racial contempt for the Russian people including their ability to run their economic affairs well, when they thought that the larger western economy would easily overwhelm the Russian one. They are so wrong it is embarrassing; but they did not know how to put their provocation into reverse gear. So now they have to deal with the reality on the ground.
(There is now a Ukrainian rump state, the carcass of which they will have to pay for and keep alive on life support. I am doubtful NATO countries will do this for a very long time. Especially the Americans. Ukraine is not strategic to American interests (it may be to Biden and the Democrats) but it is not for Trump and the vast majority of US citizens). That simply means that the American desire to keep donating money and weapons to Kyiv (especially when these prove to be ineffective) will die out soon enough. This is not a sustainable venture.
(I maintain my view: No wars can be sustained on charity.
(And in Europe every popular elected leader that backed the proxy war is now in political trouble, especially Macron and Scholtz. I should also include South Korea. Both countries (all three countries) have no government that has a popular mandate. How do these organize themselves to run adequate government in addition to sustaining a Ukraine in comatose and needing massive infusions of money? Didn’t they think this through, three years ago when they provoked Moscow to launch their invasion?
(And they have a serious refugee problem going forward when Ukrainians desert their devastated country. This winter, the urbanites will experience the bitter, biting cold. These poor folks will head westward.
(As of today, the peace proposals from the collective west are that Ukraine will end up like the Korean peninsula -divided and waiting for another fight. I don’t think so. That kind of effort would require 100,000 peacekeeping troops (and three times that amount in rotation), and America has already said it will not be involved in such a thing. Neither have any of the European countries committed. The politicians who are shouting the loudest about going to war with Russia to contain them come from countries with zero military capabilities, like the Baltic states, which just want America to step up to defend them since they perceive themselves as the most vulnerable. No, Ukraine won’t end up like the Koreas. It will end up like South Vietnam.
(Would Trump save Ukraine? Very unlikely… MAGA does not include Kyiv or any of the Baltic states, or for that matter, any part of Europe. And the western European states have bankrupted themselves by giving a lot of their weapons and military budgets to Kyiv. The Zelenskyy regime has failed so miserably that only propaganda kept the country going, which was so evident from 2023 onwards. They were just making blue pills. Once people start to take the red pill and see the truth for what it is, we will see a Vietnamization of the country. Ukraine, like South Vietnam, is doomed. I will be surprised if this new South Vietnam will last longer than the last one which collapsed in weeks.
(No reverse gear in the Ukrainian project got the Europeans into deeper trouble – they kept up the sanctions (tens of thousands of them just to make headlines when after a few months, none of them worked) which took away their best resource they were getting from a Russia willing to sell them their energy. Now they are de-industrializing. Every western European country is in recession, and this is not of the business cycle kind which can be solved by monetary policy. The downturn is structural. Where is the money to fight another war?? Russia has shown that in the midst of widespread sanctions, it can still grow its GDP at 4%. And Russia is now on par with Germany in its economic standing. Western Europe is struggling to top 0%. The EU and European NATO will enter a similar phase of economic development as had happened to them in the aftermath of WW2. By proxy, they have wrecked their own economies. But in the 1950’s, the Americans needed Europe to push back the Iron Curtain. Now, with Trump in the White House, and the Iron Curtain revealed to be a Churchillian exaggeration, these countries will not get a penny.
(All in all, in both Taiwan and Ukraine, citizens should learn that as small countries situated next to powerful large neighbours, it is never a good idea to demand or assert your sovereignty. Yes, it is good to be free and democratic, but if you have to poke your neighbour with the help of a third larger country, then you are exposing yourself to the wrath of the large neighbour. Why bother? If the elephant next door just rolls over to your side, you will be squashed. Ukraine and Taiwan should learn that it is not to their benefit to demand your rights. Get along with the neighbour and don’t provoke. Taiwan has not reached the point of provocation, but it is too late for Ukraine.
(In that respect, for those who fear a US dollar collapse, what are you going to switch into? Euros and Pound Sterling? Or S Korean Won? Nothing in Europe or in Korea will be worth as much as a greenback for the foreseeable future.)
By:
Wai Cheong
The writer has been in financial services for more than forty years. He graduated with First Class Honours in Economics and Statistics, winning a prize in 1976 for being top student for the whole university in his year. He also holds an MBA with Honors from the University of Chicago. He is a Chartered Financial Analyst.
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